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Summary
Investors systematically deviate from rationality when
making financial decisions, yet the mechanisms re-
sponsible for these deviations have not been iden-
tified. Using event-related fMRI, we examined whether
anticipatory neural activity would predict optimal and
suboptimal choices in a financial decision-making
task. We characterized two types of deviations from
the optimal investment strategy of a rational risk-neu-
tral agent as risk-seeking mistakes and risk-aversion
mistakes. Nucleus accumbens activation preceded
risky choices as well as risk-seeking mistakes, while
anterior insula activation preceded riskless choices
as well as risk-aversion mistakes. These findings
suggest that distinct neural circuits linked to anticipa-
tory affect promote different types of financial choices
and indicate that excessive activation of these cir-
cuits may lead to investing mistakes. Thus, consider-
ation of anticipatory neural mechanisms may add pre-
dictive power to the rational actor model of economic
decision making.
Introduction
Individual investors systematically deviate from optimal
behavior, which could influence asset valuation (Daniel
et al., 2002; Hirshleifer, 2001; Odean, 1998). The causes
of these deviations have not been established, but
emotion may have some influence. While some re-
search has examined the role of emotion in decision
making (Camerer et al., 2005; Loewenstein et al., 2001)
and economists have begun to incorporate emotion
into models of individual choice (Bernheim and Rangel,
2004; Caplin and Leahy, 2001), scientists still lack a
mechanistic account of how emotion might influence
choice. Understanding such mechanisms might help
theorists to specify more accurate models of individual
decision making, which could ultimately improve the
design of economic institutions so as to facilitate opti-
mal investor behavior.
Here, we sought to examine whether neural activa-
tion linked to anticipatory affect would predict financial
choices. At least two hypotheses have been put forth
regarding the role of affect in decision making. Accord-*Correspondence: camelia@stanford.edu (C.M.K.); knutson@psych.
stanford.edu (B.K.)
3 These authors contributed equally to this work.ing to one account, undifferentiated arousal might be
related to both risk seeking and risk aversion (Lo and
Repin, 2002). However, according to a second account,
positive aroused feelings associated with anticipation
of gain (e.g., “excitement”) may promote risk taking,
whereas negative aroused feelings associated with an-
ticipation of loss (e.g., “anxiety”) may promote risk
aversion (Knutson et al., 2005; Paulus et al., 2003).
Recent evidence from human brain imaging implies
that affect evoked by the anticipation of gain and loss
may carry distinct neural signatures. Specifically, the
nucleus accumbens (NAcc) of the ventral striatum
shows proportional activation during anticipation of
monetary gains (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001),
and this activation correlates with positive aroused affect
(Bjork et al., 2004; Knutson et al., 2005; Martinez et al.,
2003). Neural markers of anticipatory negative affect
have not been as clearly delineated, but the anterior
insula provides a candidate substrate for a number of
reasons. First, brain imaging studies have consistently
reported activation of the anterior insula during antici-
pation of physical pain, which correlates with self-
reported state anxiety (Buchel and Dolan, 2000; Chua
et al., 1999; Ploghaus et al., 1999). Second, the anterior
insula shows activation during anticipation of aversive
visual stimuli (Simmons et al., 2004). Third, the anterior
insula shows activation during risky choice in games
involving nonmonetary incentives, which correlates
with subsequent risk-aversion and trait measures of
negative aroused affect (Paulus et al., 2003). Although
the anterior insula is also sensitive to attentional and
other demands (Phan et al., 2002), a recent review sug-
gests that activation in this region is more common un-
der negative than positive affective circumstances (Wa-
ger et al., 2003).
The goals of this experiment were, first, to determine
whether anticipatory activity in the NAcc and anterior
insula would differentially predict risk-seeking versus
risk-averse choices and, second, to examine whether
activation in these regions would precede both subop-
timal and optimal choices. Two studies have correlated
anticipatory neural activation with choice, but both in-
volved choices that occurred in the context of social
interactions (which might prove more susceptible to af-
fective biases) rather than financial decisions (Fehr et
al., 2004; Sanfey et al., 2003). Another study demon-
strated a correlation between neural activation and im-
mediate versus delayed reward choices, but did not in-
vestigate risky choices (McClure et al., 2004).
To investigate the influence of anticipatory neural ac-
tivation on financial risk taking, we combined a dy-
namic investment task with event-related fMRI. We
compared subjects’ actual investment choices during
the task to those of a rational risk-neutral agent who
maximizes expected utility. Suboptimal choices were
defined as deviations from this model and included
both “risk-seeking mistakes” (in which people take
risks when they should not) and “risk-aversion mis-
takes” (in which people do not take risks when they
should).
Neuron
764We designed a task to elicit a range of investment
behaviors, including risk-seeking and risk-averse fi-
nancial choices. The Behavioral Investment Allocation
Strategy (BIAS) task consisted of 20 blocks of 10 trials
each (see Figure 1). During each trial, subjects first saw
two stocks and a bond (Anticipation) and then chose
one when the word “Choose” appeared above the as-
sets (Choice). Then subjects waited for a brief period
(Wait), after which their earnings for that trial and total
earnings were displayed (Outcome). These were fol-
lowed by a display of the outcomes of all assets on that
trial (Market) and a fixation cross (Fixation; see Figure 1).
At the beginning of each block (indicated by a cue),
one of the two stocks was randomly assigned to be the
“good” stock, while the other was assigned to be the
“bad” stock, without the subject’s knowledge. The
good stock dominated the bad stock in the sense of
first-order stochastic dominance (Huang and Litzen-
berger, 1988). Specifically, outcomes of the good stock
(i.e., +$10 with 50% probability, +$0 with 25% prob-
ability, and −$10 with 25% probability) were better than
outcomes of the bad stock (i.e., +$10 with 25% prob-
ability, +$0 with 25% probability, and −$10 with 50%
probability) on average for each trial. The bond paid $1
with 100% probability on each trial. Earnings were
drawn independently from these distributions for each
trial, and subjects were informed about the distribu-
tions before performing the task.
Based on prior research, we first predicted that gain
versus loss outcomes would activate the NAcc and me-
sial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (Knutson et al., 2003) and
that loss versus gain outcomes would instead activate
the anterior insula (Paulus et al., 2003). We then exam-
ined whether NAcc activation preceded both optimal
and suboptimal stock (i.e., risky) choices, as well as
whether anterior insula activation instead preceded
both optimal and suboptimal bond (i.e., riskless) choices.
Results
Analyses of brain imaging data focused on changes in
activation during outcome, market, and anticipation
periods prior to a given choice. Analyses proceeded
through two stages. In the first “localization” stage, we
constructed group statistical maps to identify foci of
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2 s per panel.nterest and then verified the predicted patterns of acti-
ation with multivariate regressions. In the second “pre-
iction” stage, we used activation extracted from these
oci during the anticipation period to predict both opti-
al and suboptimal subsequent investment choices
ith logit regression models.
In localization analyses of the outcome period, stock
ain versus loss outcomes were associated with NAcc
nd MPFC activation at both the small volume-cor-
ected and global thresholds, as predicted (Knutson et
l., 2003) (see Table 1 and Figure 2). Although the ante-
ior insula did not show significant deactivation at the
lobal threshold, bilateral foci did show the only deacti-
ations in the brain for this contrast that passed the
mall volume-corrected threshold (TC = −39, 19, 7; Z =
2.99; TC = 38, 19, 11; Z = −2.99). Other regions that
assed the global threshold included right orbitofrontal
ortex, left anterior cingulate, left precuneus, and left
osterior cingulate, replicating prior findings (Knutson
t al., 2003). Multiple regression of VOI data (hemody-
amic lag = 4 s) verified that, after prior stock choice,
ain outcomes were associated with increased NAcc
nd MPFC activation (all p values < 0.05; see Table S1
n the Supplemental Data available online).
In analyses of the market period, relative gain out-
omes (i.e., larger difference between the outcome of
he chosen versus unchosen stock) were also associ-
ted with MPFC activation at the small volume-cor-
ected and global thresholds, as predicted (see Table 2
nd Figure 2). Other areas that passed the global
hreshold included left middle frontal gyrus, bilateral
audate, left putamen, and dorsomedial thalamus. Mul-able 1. Activation Foci for Choice Outcome: Contrast of Gain
ersus Loss following Stock Choice
egion Z Score Talairach Coordinates
MPFC 5.34 −3, 56, 4
MPFC 5.47 −3, 49, 0
OFC 3.89 22, 36, −8
NAcc 6.41 11, 12, −3
NAcc 5.82 −13, 8, −4
Ant. Cing 4.07 −1, −1, 34
Precuneus 4.71 −1, −33, 43
Post. Cing. 5.11 −3, −34, 27
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765Figure 2. Effect of Actual and Relative Out-
comes on Neural Activation
The top panels depict the contrast of large
gains versus large losses during the Out-
come period following stock choice. The
bottom panels depict the contrast of chosen
versus unchosen outcomes during the Mar-
ket period following stock choice. n = 19.bond. However, anticipatory anterior cingulate activa-
Table 2. Activation Foci for Market Outcome: Contrast of Chosen
Stock versus Unchosen Stock Value
Region Z Score Talairach Coordinates
L MFG 3.93 −3, 56, 8
L MPFC 4.26 −3, 49, −5
L Caudate 4.46 −7, 19, 8
R Caudate 4.59 7, 19, 8
L Putamen 4.14 −20, 9, −2
DM Thalamus 5.00 −1, −7, 12tivariate regression of VOI data verified that, after a
stock choice, relative gain outcomes increased NAcc
and MPFC activation. Conversely, relative loss out-
comes increased anterior insula activation (see Table
S2). After a bond choice, relative gain outcomes (i.e.,
either of the stocks performed worse than the bond)
increased MPFC activation (see Table S3).
While not the focus of this study, uncertainty corre-
lated maximally and negatively with bilateral anterior
cingulate foci, easily exceeding the global threshold
(TC = +4 16, 45; Z = −5.37; TC = −4, 16, 45; Z = −6.99).
Further analysis of anticipatory activation extracted
from these foci revealed that activation was not great-
est with maximal uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty = 0.5,
corresponding to minimal information about which
stock to choose), but rather with maximal conflict (i.e.,
uncertainty = 0.3, corresponding to minimal information
about whether to choose the stock or the bond). Specif-
ically, activation in this region was −0.08 ± 0.01 (mean ±
SEM, n = 2100) when uncertainty was less than 0.25;
−0.05 ± 0.01 (n = 868) when uncertainty was between
0.25 and 0.35; and −0.15 ± 0.02 (n = 832) when uncer-
tainty was greater than 0.35. Additionally, anterior cin-
gulate anticipatory activation robustly predicted sub-
jects’ subsequent reaction time [t(3718) = 7.92, R2 =
0.15 in a linear regression model that included subject
fixed effects]. Thus, anticipatory anterior cingulate acti-
vation correlated most robustly not with uncertainty,
which was greatest when it was unclear which stock to
choose, but rather with conflict, which was greatest
when it was unclear whether to choose a stock or thetion did not correlate with subsequent choice, as de-
scribed below.
In prediction analyses, we included anticipatory
NAcc, MPFC, and anterior insula activation (lag = 4 s) in
logistic regression models of subsequent choice, after
incorporating relevant behavioral variables (see Tables
3–5). Adding activation from control regions (i.e., bilat-
eral anterior cingulate, orbitofrontal cortex, medial cau-
date, and amygdala) did not increase explanatory
power, and so, data from these regions were not in-
cluded in subsequent prediction analyses.
Logistic regressions indicated that anticipatory NAcc
and anterior insula activation were correlated with sub-
sequent choice and that these associations critically
depended upon prior choice. For all choices, anticipa-
tory NAcc activation increased the likelihood of choos-
ing a stock only when the prior choice was a bond (a
0.1% increase in NAcc activation led to a 0.06% in-
crease in the odds of choosing a stock; p < 0.05). When
the prior choice was a stock, anticipatory anterior in-
sula activation increased the likelihood of choosing the
bond (a 0.1% increase in anterior insula activation led
to a 0.08% increase in the odds of choosing a bond;
p < 0.05; see Table 3 and Figure 3). MPFC activation
did not correlate with subsequent choice. Thus, high
NAcc activation preceded switching to risk-seeking
choices, while high anterior insula activation preceded
switching to risk-averse choices.
Logistic regressions also indicated that anticipatory
NAcc and anterior insula activation were correlated
with the types of mistakes that subjects made. When
the prior choice was riskless (i.e., the bond), anticipa-
tory NAcc activation increased the likelihood of making
a risk-seeking mistake (a 0.1% increase in NAcc activa-
tion led to a 0.07% increase in the odds of making a
risk-seeking mistake; p < 0.05). Also, anticipatory NAcc
activation decreased the likelihood of making a risk-
aversion mistake (a 0.1% increase in NAcc activation
led to a 0.06% decrease in the odds of making a risk-
aversion mistake; p < 0.05). When the prior choice was
risky (i.e., a stock), anterior insula activation increased
the likelihood of making a risk-aversion mistake (a 0.1%
increase in insula activation led to a 0.11% increase in
odds of making a risk-aversion mistake; p < 0.05; see
Neuron
766Table 3. Logit Estimation of the Probability of Choosing a Stock or
Bond in Trial t
Previous Previous
Choice Was Choice Was
a Stock the Bond All Data
StockChoicet Coef Coef Coef
lNAcctANT −0.0498 0.5889 0.3192
(0.24) (3.21)*** (2.70)***
lMPFCtANT −0.0461 −0.0222 −0.0137
(0.26) (0.15) (0.14)
linsulatANT −0.7875 0.1910 −0.2359
(3.04)*** (0.89) (1.69)*
RelEarningst-1 −0.0550 0.0447 −0.0360
(5.18)*** (4.08)*** (6.65)***
Outcomet-1 −0.0253 −0.0452
(1.88)* (4.65)***
Uncertaintyt −4.7256 −8.8818 −8.1441
(7.68)*** (12.89)*** (21.42)***
CumEarningst-1 −0.0036 −0.0017 −0.0031
(3.43)*** (1.99)** (5.51)***
Constant 2.7542 1.8624 2.7986
(7.37)*** (5.30)*** (12.33)***
Observations 1578 1595 3367
Pseudo R-sq 0.27 0.31 0.33
Robust Z statistics are in parentheses. *significant at 10%;
**significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The dependent variable,
StockChoicet, is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a stock was
chosen and 0 if the bond was chosen on trial t. lNAcctANT,
lMPFCtANT, and linsulatANT are activations in the left NAcc, MPFC,
and anterior insula in the Anticipation period of trial t. RelEarningst
is equal to the difference between the dividends on trial t of the
stock not chosen and those of the chosen stock. If the asset
chosen in trial t was the bond, RelEarningst is equal to the
maximum dividend paid by the two stocks on that trial. Outcomet
is equal to the earnings made on trial t. Uncertaintyt is the
uncertainty of the choice and defined as min(Pr{Stock T = Good
| History}, Pr{Stock R = Good | History}). CumEarningst is wealth
accumulated during the task up to and including trial t. Subject
fixed effects are included, with robust standard errors. Inclusion of
brain variables increases R-sq by 1% in each regression.
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bable 4. Logit Estimation of the Probability of Making a Risk-
version Mistake in Trial t
Previous Previous
Choice Was Choice Was
a Stock the Bond All Data
AMt Coef Coef Coef
NAcctANT 0.2962 −0.5787 −0.1973
(1.11) (2.34)** (1.21)
MPFCtANT −0.1224 −0.1361 −0.1578
(0.52) (0.61) (1.11)
insulatANT 1.0985 0.1027 0.4973
(3.22)*** (0.34) (2.56)**
elEarningst-1 0.0474 −0.0511 0.0384
(3.45)*** (3.20)*** (5.02)***
utcomet-1 0.0495 0.0497
(2.47)** (3.89)***
ncertaintyt 3.9333 11.6122 11.7142
(2.25)** (7.52)*** (11.86)***
umEarningst-1 0.0019 0.0016 0.0026
(1.40) (1.58) (3.67)***
onstant −2.3645 −2.4798 −3.3136
(5.27)*** (5.11)*** (10.64)***
bservations 1015 694 1857
seudo R-sq 0.26 0.21 0.25
obust Z statistics are in parentheses. *significant at 10%;
*significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The dependent variable,
AMt (Risk-Aversion Mistake), is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
he bond was chosen on trial t while the optimal choice was one
f the stocks. lNAcctANT, lMPFCtANT, and linsulatANT are activations
n the left NAcc, MPFC, and anterior insula in the Anticipation
eriod of trial t. StockChoicet is an indicator variable equal to 1 if
stock was chosen and 0 if the bond was chosen on trial t.
elEarningst is equal to the difference between the dividends on
rial t of the stock not chosen and those of the chosen stock. If the
sset chosen in trial t was the bond, RelEarningst is equal to the
aximum dividend paid by the two stocks on that trial. Outcomet
s equal to the earnings made on trial t. Uncertaintyt is the
ncertainty of the choice and defined as min(Pr{Stock T = Good
History}, Pr{Stock R = Good | History}). CumEarningst is wealth
ccumulated during the task up to and including trial t. Subject
ixed effects are included, with robust standard errors. Inclusion of
rain variables increases R-sq by 1% in each regression.Tables 4 and 5 and Figure 3). MPFC activation was not
correlated with subsequent mistakes. Thus, anticipa-
tory neural activation correlated with both optimal and
suboptimal subsequent choices, even after controlling
for behavioral variables that should have been the pri-
mary determinants of those choices.
Finally, we investigated whether individual differ-
ences in average anticipatory activation correlated with
subsequent choice, after establishing that average an-
ticipatory activation varied across individuals. Because
regression of anticipatory NAcc activation on subject
fixed effects yielded no significant differences, relation-
ships between individual differences in anticipatory
NAcc activation and choice were not examined further.
On the other hand, regression of anticipatory anterior
insula activation on subject fixed effects did yield sig-
nificant differences in 8 (all p values < 0.05) of 19 sub-
jects, suggesting some individual differences in antici-
patory insula activation. Individual differences in average
anterior insula activation during anticipation were sig-
nificantly correlated with the frequency of choosing a
bond after having chosen a stock [t(17) = 2.14, p < 0.05;
R2 = 0.21]. Additionally, individual differences in average
anterior insula activation during anticipation were also
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fignificantly correlated with the frequency of risk-aver-
ion mistakes after having chosen a stock [t(17) = 2.10,
< 0.05, R2 = 0.21]. Thus, individual differences in an-
icipatory anterior insula activation were related to
aking subsequent riskless choices and risk-aversion
istakes.
iscussion
hile NAcc activation preceded both risky choices and
isk-seeking mistakes, anterior insula activation pre-
eded both riskless choices and risk-aversion mis-
akes. These findings are consistent with the hypothe-
is that NAcc represents gain prediction (Knutson et al.,
001), while anterior insula represents loss prediction
Paulus et al., 2003). One of the contributions of this
aper is the BIAS task, as it provides a way to opera-
ionalize optimal choices, which by extension allows
he identification of suboptimal choices. According to
inancial models, one can define risk-neutral choices
ased on Bayesian updating as rational and deviations
rom these choices as irrational. The results therefore
Neural Basis of Financial Risk Taking
767Figure 3. Association of Anticipatory Neural Activation with Subse-
quent Choice
The left panel indicates a significant effect of anterior insula activa-
tion on the odds of making riskless (bond) choices and risk-aver-
sion mistakes (RAM) after a stock choice (Stockt-1). The right panel
indicates a significant effect of NAcc activation on the odds of
making risk-aversion mistakes, risky choices, and risk-seeking mis-
takes (RSM) after a bond choice (Bondt-1). The odds ratio for a
given choice is defined as the ratio of the probability of making that
choice divided by the probability of not making that choice. Per-
cent change in odds ratio results from a 0.1% increase in NAcc or
anterior insula activation. Error bars indicate the standard errors of
the estimated effect. *coefficient significant at p < 0.05.indicate that, above and beyond contributing to rational
choice, anticipatory neural activation may also promote
irrational choice. Thus, financial decision making may
require a delicate balance—recruitment of distinct cir-
cuits may be necessary for taking or avoiding risks, but
excessive activation of one mechanism or the other
may lead to mistakes.
While the observation that NAcc activation is corre-
lated with subsequent risk taking and risk-seeking mis-
takes agrees with a gain prediction account of NAcc
function (Knutson et al., 2001), the current findings are
not as consistent with alternative accounts. Motor
preparation accounts predict equal activation prior to
motor acts of equal force (Mogenson et al., 1980) and
so cannot explain the NAcc’s prediction of risk-seeking
but not risk-averse choices, since both required active
choices indicated by button presses. Similarly, a sali-
ency account predicts equal activation during anticipa-
tion of both large gains and losses (Zink et al., 2003)
and so cannot account for the NAcc’s prediction of
risk-seeking but not risk-averse choices. Finally, a be-
havioral switching account predicts that NAcc activa-
tion will increase prior to any switch from a repeated
behavior to a novel behavior (Robbins et al., 1986).
While the influence of the NAcc in biasing choice was
most pronounced when subjects switched from risk-
averse to risk-seeking choices, NAcc activation did not
predict switches in the opposite direction (from risk-
seeking to risk-averse choices). The same arguments
apply in reverse to the anterior insula predicting risk-
averse choices. In either case, theories that fail to in-
clude the anticipated subjective value of an outcome
cannot easily account for the observed pattern of re-
sults.
Although both actual and relative gain outcomes in-
creased activation in the MPFC, MPFC activation did
not predict subsequent risk-taking behavior, consistent
with its proposed role in representing gain prediction
error rather than gain prediction (Knutson et al., 2003).
Gain outcomes also activated other regions implicatedin decision making (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex, medial
caudate, anterior cingulate cortex), but activation in
these regions also did not predict subsequent risk-
taking behavior. While activation in these regions do
not correlate with subsequent risk taking, these regions
may still play other important roles in decision making
(O’Doherty et al., 2003). For instance, anterior cingulate
foci showed increased activation under conditions of
increased response conflict, consistent with the pos-
tulated role of this region in conflict monitoring (Ridde-
rinkhof et al., 2004).
The BIAS task offers a number of advantages in elic-
iting financial choice behavior. First, because the BIAS
task utilizes monetary incentives in a dynamic setting,
our findings may generalize to real-world trading sce-
narios. Second, the BIAS task enables identification of
both optimal choices and suboptimal choices. Third,
the BIAS task elicits a range of behaviors from each
individual, including both risk-seeking and risk-averse
choices. Fourth, the event-related design of the study
allowed us to correlate anticipatory rather than concur-
rent neural activation with choice by temporally isolat-Table 5. Logit Estimation of the Probability of Making a Risk-
Seeking Mistake in Trial t
Previous Previous
Choice Was Choice Was
a Stock the Bond All Data
RSMt Coef Coef Coef
lNAcctANT 0.3998 0.7395 0.4868
(0.93) (2.63)*** (2.69)***
lMPFCtANT −0.4330 −0.1108 −0.1210
(1.44) (0.50) (0.81)
linsulatANT −0.6024 0.4430 −0.0577
(1.19) (1.30) (0.27)
RelEarningst-1 −0.0838 0.0395 −0.0152
(3.81)*** (2.34)** (1.67)*
Outcomet-1 0.0037 −0.0416
(0.16) (2.49)**
Uncertaintyt −12.4172 −14.6378 −8.8036
(6.20)*** (5.37)*** (8.07)***
CumEarningst-1 −0.0089 −0.0008 −0.0038
(4.32)*** (0.58) (4.22)***
Constant 7.1203 3.1759 2.9538
(5.93)*** (2.58)*** (5.24)***
Observations 353 874 1295
Pseudo R-sq 0.30 0.34 0.25
Robust Z statistics are in parentheses. *significant at 10%; **sig-
nificant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. The dependent variable, RSMt
(Risk-Seeking Mistake), is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a stock
was chosen on trial t while the optimal choice was the bond.
lNAcctANT, lMPFCtANT, and linsulatANT are activations in the left
NAcc, MPFC, and anterior insula in the Anticipation period of trial
t. StockChoicet is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a stock was
chosen and 0 if the bond was chosen on trial t. RelEarningst is
equal to the difference between the dividends on trial t of the stock
not chosen and those of the chosen stock. If the asset chosen in
trial t was the bond, RelEarningst is equal to the maximum dividend
paid by the two stocks on that trial. Outcomet is equal to the
earnings made on trial t. Uncertaintyt is the uncertainty of the
choice (or uncertainty of the environment) and defined as
min(Pr{Stock T = Good | History}, Pr{Stock R = Good | History}).
CumEarningst is wealth accumulated during the task up to and
including trial t. Subject fixed effects are included, with robust
standard errors. Inclusion of brain variables increases R-sq by 1%
in each regression.
Neuron
768ing anticipatory activation and controlling for key ante-
cedent behavioral variables (i.e., earnings, uncertainty).
While the event-related analyses ensured that both
anticipatory activation and decision making occurred
prior to actual choice, the dynamic nature of the BIAS
task leaves open the question of whether anticipatory
activation preceded decision making or the reverse.
Some of the present findings support the idea that acti-
vation preceded decision making. Specifically, the link
between activation and subsequent choice critically
depended upon prior choice. For example, if NAcc acti-
vation simply reflected the decision to pick a stock,
then the relationship between NAcc activation and the
likelihood of choosing a stock should not depend upon
prior choice. However, anticipatory NAcc activation sig-
nificantly predicted the likelihood of subsequent stock
choice only if the bond was picked on the previous trial
(see Table 3). The same argument also applies to insula
activation. Future research that specifically manipu-
lates anticipatory activation could further establish
whether such activation influences decisions.
The dynamic nature of the BIAS task may have ob-
scured stable individual differences in NAcc activation,
which might influence subsequent choice, but are more
evident in stationary tasks (Knutson et al., 2005). How-
ever, even during this dynamic task, significant indi-
vidual differences were evident in insula activation dur-
ing anticipation, and these predicted switching from
risky to riskless choices as well as the likelihood of
making risk-aversion mistakes while doing so. The link
between individual differences in anterior insula activa-
tion and subsequent risk-averse choices replicates and
extends prior findings (Paulus et al., 2003).
While experts and nonexperts who differed in terms
of prior coursework in finance and statistics did not sig-
nificantly differ in behavior in this experiment, future re-
search should also examine the influence of individual
differences in trading experience on financial risk ta-
king, since psychophysiological evidence suggests
that experienced traders may show less emotional re-
sponsiveness to market events than inexperienced
traders (Lo and Repin, 2002). While many psychophysi-
ological measures (e.g., skin conductance, heart rate,
pupillary dilation) index anticipatory arousal, the current
results suggest that measures that probe anticipatory
valence will also be necessary to predict the likelihood
of subsequent risky choice.
Overall, these findings suggest that risk-seeking
choices (such as gambling at a casino) and risk-averse
choices (such as buying insurance) may be driven by
two distinct neural circuits involving the NAcc and the
anterior insula. The findings are consistent with the no-
tion that activation in the NAcc and anterior insula, re-
spectively, index positive and negative anticipatory af-
fective states and that activating one of these two
regions can lead to a shift in risk preferences. This may
explain why casinos surround their guests with reward
cues (e.g., inexpensive food, free liquor, surprise gifts,
potential jackpot prizes)—anticipation of rewards acti-
vates the NAcc, which may lead to an increase in the
likelihood of individuals switching from risk-averse to
risk-seeking behavior. A similar story in reverse may ap-
ply to the marketing strategies employed by insurance
companies.
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tConsideration of risk necessarily involves weighing
otential gains against potential losses. The notion that
istinct neural mechanisms anticipate gain versus loss
uggests a novel componential view of risk taking. Com-
ined with such a view, these findings provide neural tar-
ets for investigating complex risk phenomena such as
oss aversion, in which people weigh losses more than
ains of equivalent size (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
hese findings further imply that neuroeconomic re-
earch may foster a more comprehensive theory of in-
ividual decision making than the rational actor model
nd thus may ultimately yield new insights relevant to
conomic policy and institutional design.
xperimental Procedures
ineteen healthy volunteers (10 females, mean age = 27, range =
4–39 years, right handed) participated in the study. Prior to enter-
ng the scanner, subjects played a practice version of the invest-
ent task for at least 10 min, minimizing learning effects. Subjects
ere then shown the cash they could earn by performing the task
uccessfully and correctly reported believing that they would re-
eive cash at the end of the experiment contingent upon their per-
ormance. Subjects received a fixed compensation of $20 per hour,
s well as a tenth of their total task earnings. They were also in-
ormed that it was possible to lose money on the task and that any
osses would be deducted from their total payment.
To elicit a range of investment behavior, subjects included both
experts” and “nonexperts,” depending on whether they had taken
rior graduate coursework in statistics and finance. Experts in-
luded Ph.D. students in finance, economics, or accounting, while
onexperts included Ph.D. students in humanities at Stanford Uni-
ersity, to equate age, socioeconomic status, education, and intelli-
ence. A 2 (expert versus nonexpert-between) × 20 (block-within)
nalysis of variance revealed a main effect of block [F(19,323) =
.35, p < 0.005], indicating that subjects chose the bond more often
s the experiment progressed. However, experts and nonexperts
id not significantly differ in choice of stocks versus bonds, either
verall (54% ± 6% versus 53% ± 6%) or across blocks. Experts
nd nonexperts also did not significantly differ in the proportion of
isk-seeking mistakes [26% ± 6% versus 35% ± 8%; t(17) = 0.88,
.s.] or risk-aversion mistakes they made overall [23% ± 6% versus
9% ± 6%; t(17) = 0.67, n.s.; calculated as percentage of mistakes
ade on trials where mistakes of that type were possible], suggest-
ng more of a performance continuum than distinct groupings.
ince choices and mistakes did not significantly differ between
xperts and nonexperts, we combined groups in subsequent
nalyses.
ehavioral Analysis
n the context of the BIAS task, the optimal strategy of a rational,
isk-neutral agent is to pick a stock if he or she expects to receive
dividend that is at least as large as the bond earnings. Since the
ctual monetary amounts at stake in each trial were small (−$1 to
1), we used risk neutrality as the baseline model of investor beha-
ior (Rabin, 2000), a model which assumes that individuals maxi-
ize expected return. A rational actor should also update his or
er beliefs about the probability of each stock being optimal ac-
ording to Bayes’ rule. Based on these assumptions, we derived
he optimal portfolio selection strategy, which was the same for all
rials (see Supplementary Data).
For each trial, the objective probability of each of the two stocks
eing dominant can be computed using Bayes’ rule. We refer to
he minimum of these two probabilities as “uncertainty” for that
rial. Uncertainty is highest (and equal to 0.5) at the beginning of a
lock, when the probability of either stock being optimal is 50%,
nd decreases as more information about dividends is revealed,
larifying which stock dominates. On trials where uncertainty was
.3 or lower, the optimal choice was one of the stocks—otherwise,
he optimal choice was the bond. Thus, when uncertainty is close
o the threshold value of 0.3, it is most difficult for subjects to deter-
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769mine the optimal strategy (i.e., whether to choose a bond versus
stock), leading to maximum conflict. Thus, uncertainty is maximal
when subjects cannot distinguish which of the two stocks is better,
while conflict is maximal when subjects cannot distinguish whether
it is better to choose a stock or the bond.
For each trial, we compared subjects’ investment choices to
those of a rational, risk-neutral agent. Deviations from this model
were defined as different types of “mistakes.” These mistakes fell
into three categories. Subjects might (1) pick a stock when the
bond was the optimal choice (“risk-seeking mistake”), (2) pick the
bond when a stock was the optimal choice (“risk-aversion mis-
take”), or (3) pick a stock when the other stock is the optimal
choice (“confusion mistake”). Confusion mistakes occurred in less
than 1% of the trials and thus were not considered in subsequent
analyses. We used logit models to predict the likelihood of choos-
ing a stock or making either type of mistake conditional, as well as
unconditional, on prior choice.
We predicted that several behavioral variables would influence
subsequent choice (i.e., prior choice, prior outcome, relative earn-
ings of chosen versus unchosen assets, cumulative earnings, and
uncertainty). Logistic regressions indicated that, when the prior
choice was a stock, lower relative earnings reduced the likelihood
of choosing a stock again (see Table 3). When the prior choice was
a bond, lower relative earnings increased the likelihood of switch-
ing to a stock. Moreover, as predicted and independent of prior
choice, increasing uncertainty increased the likelihood of choosing
the bond. These predicted findings provided behavioral evidence
for the validity of the task.
Additionally, and independent of prior choice, increasing cumula-
tive earnings increased the likelihood of choosing a bond (see Ta-
ble 3). When the prior choice was a stock, increasing cumulative
earnings also decreased the likelihood of making a risk-seeking
mistake. When the prior choice was a stock, decreased relative
earnings increased the likelihood of making a risk-aversion mistake
(see Table 4). On the other hand, when the prior choice was a bond,
decreased relative earnings increased the likelihood of making a
risk-seeking mistake (see Table 5). Outcomes also influenced sub-
sequent choice. When the prior choice was a stock, increasing out-
come increased the likelihood of choosing a bond as well as the
likelihood of making a risk-aversion mistake (see Tables 3 and 4).
Because behavioral variables including prior outcome, relative
earnings of the chosen versus unchosen asset, cumulative earn-
ings, and uncertainty all influenced subsequent choice, we in-
cluded them as covariates in prediction analyses.
fMRI Acquisition
Images were acquired with a 1.5T General Electric MRI scanner
using a standard birdcage quadrature head coil. Twenty-four 4 mm
thick slices (in-plane resolution 3.75 × 3.75 mm, no gap) extended
axially from the mid-pons to the top of the skull, providing ade-
quate spatial resolution of subcortical regions of interest (e.g., mid-
brain, ventral striatum). Functional scans of the whole brain were
acquired every 2 s (TR = 2 s) with a T2*-sensitive in-/out- spiral
pulse sequence (TE = 40 ms, flip = 90°) designed to minimize signal
dropout at the base of the brain (Glover and Law, 2001). High-reso-
lution structural scans were subsequently acquired using a T1-
weighted spoiled grass sequence (TR = 100 ms; TE = 7 ms, flip =
90°), facilitating subsequent localization and coregistration of func-
tional data.
fMRI Analysis
Localization analyses were conducted using Analysis of Functional
Neural Images (AFNI) software (Cox, 1996). For preprocessing,
voxel time series were sinc interpolated to correct for nonsimulta-
neous slice acquisition within each volume, concatenated across
runs, and corrected for three-dimensional motion. Visual inspection
of motion correction estimates confirmed that no subject’s head
moved more than 2.0 mm in any dimension from one volume
acquisition to the next. Preprocessed time series were submitted
to a regression model that included three regressors indexing re-
sidual motion and six regressors modeling baseline, linear, and
quadratic trends for each of the two runs.
Regressors of interest were convolved with a γ-variate functionthat modeled a canonical hemodynamic response prior to inclusion
in regression models (Cohen, 1997). Maps of t statistics for regres-
sors of interest were transformed into Z scores, coregistered with
structural maps, spatially normalized by warping to Talairach
space, slightly spatially smoothed (FWHM = 4 mm) to minimize the
effects of anatomical variability, resampled at 2 mm3, and com-
bined into a group map using a meta-analytic formula [average Z ×
sqrt(n)] (Knutson et al., 2000). Thresholds for statistical significance
within the predicted volumes of interest (i.e., NAcc, anterior insula,
and MPFC) were determined by a local small volume correction (3
4 mm radius spheres or 12.56 4 mm3 voxels corrected at p < 0.05
yields a threshold Z of 2.88, p < 0.004, uncorrected) and required a
minimum cluster of four contiguous voxels. Thresholds for statisti-
cal significance outside the predicted volumes of interest were set
using a global family-wise error rate that corrected for gray matter
volume in subcortical and mesial prefrontal cortical regions (ap-
proximately 500 4 mm3 voxels corrected at p < 0.05 yields a thresh-
old Z of 3.88, p < 0.0001, uncorrected; Knutson et al., 2000) and
required a minimum cluster of four contiguous voxels.
As indicated by behavioral analyses, all fMRI analyses included
covariate regressors representing cumulative earnings (defined as
current wealth earned during the task, updated at each outcome
period) and uncertainty (updated at each market period). For out-
come analyses, regressors of interest contrasted stock versus
bond choice, as well as gain versus loss outcome predicated on
stock choice. Because the BIAS task is a dynamic reward learning
task, we predicted that gain versus loss outcomes would activate
both the NAcc (gain prediction) and MPFC (gain prediction error)
(Knutson et al., 2003) and deactivate the anterior insula (Paulus et
al., 2003). For market analyses, the regressor of interest contrasted
amount earned on the current stock choice versus possible earn-
ings from the unchosen stock, predicated on prior stock choice.
As with actual outcomes, we predicted that better relative earnings
during the market period would also activate the NAcc and MPFC.
Volumes of interest (VOIs) were specified as 8 mm diameter
spheres centered on foci identified in the outcome analysis in the
NAcc, MPFC, and insula (see Table 1), thereby ensuring that equal
amounts of data were extracted for each subject in each region.
Visual inspection confirmed that VOIs encompassed only gray
matter for each individual subject (Knutson et al., 2004). Additional
control volumes of interest of the same size and shape were speci-
fied in the bilateral anterior cingulate at foci correlated with uncer-
tainty (TC = ±4, 16, 45), in the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex at foci
correlated with outcome (TC = ±26, 36, −8), and in the bilateral
amygdala (TC = ±22, −10, −26), and bilateral medial caudate (TC =
±10, 7, 10), based on the Talairach atlas, in order to verify local
specificity of predicted effects.
Prediction analyses were conducted on activation time course
data that were spatially averaged and extracted from these VOIs.
Prediction analyses tested whether NAcc activation during antici-
pation was associated with subsequent stock choice as well as
risk-seeking mistakes, after controlling for potential behavioral
confounds. Prediction analyses also tested whether anterior insula
activation during anticipation was associated with subsequent
bond choice as well as risk-aversion mistakes, after controlling for
potential behavioral confounds. Additional analyses utilized iden-
tical models, but substituted data extracted from control VOIs.
Individual differences analyses were conducted by first using lo-
gistic regressions to determine whether subject fixed effects alone
had a significant influence on VOI activation during anticipation.
Given sufficient variability across subjects in activation during an-
ticipation (e.g., fixed effects were significant in over 25% of the
subjects), logistic regressions were conducted that examined the
effects of individual differences in average VOI activation during
anticipation on the frequency of choosing the stock versus the
bond, as well as on the frequency of making risk-seeking or risk-
aversion mistakes.
Supplemental Data
The Supplemental Data for this article can be found online at http://
www.neuron.org/cgi/content/full/47/5/763/DC1/.
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